Paying court convictions unbalances the public budget?

The fiscal sustainability of the spending ceiling for precatorios (Constitutional amendments 113/2021 and 114/2021)

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to discuss whether Constitutional Amendments 113 and 114 remain faithful to the original purposes of the “New Fiscal Regime” of EC 95/2016 by subjecting the payment of federal court orders to the spending ceiling. The first part of the article deals with the spending ceiling in the constitutional text in its original form (EC 95/2016): what is it about? What was its original purpose? The second part concerns the contextual and normative aspects of Constitutional Amendments 113/2021 and 114/2021. The third and fourth parts concern the financial-budget regime of precatories. The fifth part deals with the judgment of the Federal Supreme Court on Constitutional Amendment n. 62/2009, which contingency paid precatories. The sixth and final part takes care of the main question: “Does paying judicial convictions unbalance the budget?”. In this last topic, national and international doctrines on budget balance and fiscal sustainability are used. The work is developed from the inductive and deductive methods using bibliographic and documentary material. Because it is a descriptive and exploratory study, it is carried out based on bibliographical and documental research, sometimes using the deductive method and, at other times, the inductive method, mainly in the criticisms and reflections about the doctrine, studies and normative texts.