Corruption in public procurement: Two analytical instruments for uncovering undue incentives

Authors

  • Victor Aguiar de Carvalho

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46818/pge.v1i2.26

Keywords:

Corruption, Public Procurement, Law and Economics, Pragmatism

Abstract

Corruption is a complex problem, with several possible interrelated causes. In this article, it is argued that corruption can also be analyzed under the approach that the Brazilian legal order probably offers undue and unanticipated incentives to the phenomenon. Without attempting to exhaust the subject, two possible analytical instruments that could contribute to the detection and modification of undue incentives to corruption in public procurement are examined: the economic analysis of law and the addition of pragmatic concerns to the analysis of public procurement rules.

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Author Biography

Victor Aguiar de Carvalho

Doutorando e Mestre em Direito Público pela Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro – Uerj. Pós-graduado em Direito do Estado e da Regulação pela Fundação Getúlio Vargas – FGV-RJ. Procurador do Estado e Advogado.

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Published

2018-06-09

How to Cite

Aguiar de Carvalho, V. . (2018). Corruption in public procurement: Two analytical instruments for uncovering undue incentives. Revista Eletrônica Da PGE-RJ, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.46818/pge.v1i2.26

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 2 (2018)

Section

Doctrines

License

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