Do paradigma da ineficiência da Lei nº 8.666 de 1993 à contratação baseada na eficiência –

o que mudou e para onde vamos?

Abstract

The article proposes to discuss how public procurement based on efficiency, in particular, in relation to the possibility of establishing variable remuneration to the contractor, given the fulfillment of goals established by the Public Administration, entered the Brazilian model of public tenders and contracts. Federal Law No. 8.666 of 1993, based on the literalness of its provisions, under a fixed remuneration system, quickly demonstrated its low efficiency as a mechanism to stimulate the efficiency of the contractor in fulfilling the object of the contract, which did not escape strong criticism of the doctrine. From Bill No. 1,292, presented in the distant year of 1995 and approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 2019, passing through the PPP Law (Federal Law No. 11,079 of 2004), by the creation of the Differentiated Contracting Regime (RDC), by through the enactment of Federal Law No. 12,462 of 2011, and by the Law of State-Owned Companies (Federal Law No. 13,303 of 2016), a long way has been taken in favor of this new model and, for the future, there are new and possible possible routes to be taken for make public procurement more efficient by taking the contractor's remuneration as an instrument to increase the performance of public procurement.