Direct hiring due to inexigibility: controller bias and manager fear

Authors

  • Erick Halpern

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.46818/pge.v1i2.25

Keywords:

public administration, administrative contract, inexigibility of bidding, corruption, bias

Abstract

The author outlines the myth of public bidding, its objectives and assumptions, addressing the suitability of bidding inexigibility to reduce risks in the complex needs of Public Administration. At the same time, it demonstrates the relationship between the bias of controllers and the fear of public managers in the use of the institute.

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Author Biography

Erick Halpern

Advogado. Procurador do Município de Angra dos Reis/ RJ. Pós Graduado em Direito do Estado e Regulação pela Fundação Getúlio Vargas/RJ.

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Published

2018-06-09

How to Cite

Halpern, E. . (2018). Direct hiring due to inexigibility: controller bias and manager fear. Revista Eletrônica Da PGE-RJ, 1(2). https://doi.org/10.46818/pge.v1i2.25

Issue

Vol. 1 No. 2 (2018)

Section

Doctrines

License

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